M. CASEY RODGERS, Chief Judge.
The Plaintiff, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. ("the Alliance"), brought this action challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 320, Florida Statutes, which regulates the relationship between motor vehicle manufacturers and dealers in the state of Florida.
The Alliance is a non-profit trade association comprised of eleven motor vehicle manufacturers and distributors ("Members") that sell new motor vehicles and replacement parts throughout the United States.
Through this action, the Alliance seeks to invalidate three laws governing the relationship between motor vehicle licensees and dealers in the state of Florida, which the Alliance contends are unconstitutional. The first statute the Alliance challenges is Fla. Stat. § 320.696(3) and (4) (the "Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions"), which requires licensees to compensate dealers for parts and labor used in performing work pursuant to a warranty, maintenance plan, extended warranty, certified pre-owned warranty, service contract, delivery or preparation procedure, recall, campaign service, authorized goodwill, directive, or bulletin at certain rates in the event the parties cannot agree to a rate within thirty days of the dealer's written request that they attempt to do so. See Fla. Stat. § 320.696(3)(a), (4)(b).
The defendants seek dismissal of each of the Alliance's claims, arguing that the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While "`detailed factual allegations'" are not required, the plaintiff must present "more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 11355, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). "A pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This "plausibility standard" requires a showing of "more than a sheer possibility" that the defendant is liable on the claim. Id. The allegations of the complaint must set forth enough facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In other words, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to permit a court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937. As noted supra, when considering a
As discussed above, Fla. Stat. § 320.696(3) and (4) sets forth certain rates at which licensees must compensate motor vehicle dealers for parts and labor used in authorized repairs in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement as to reimbursement rates. The Alliance alleges that the statutory rates are "at or above the highest possible levels that a personal-use, retail consumer might pay, rather than at the parties' preexisting contract rights, which take[ ] into account the volume, predictability, and other benefits of such work," and that the statutes violate the Florida Due Process Clause by interfering with Members' fundamental right to negotiate reimbursement rates while bearing no rational relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare. According to the Alliance, by tying reimbursement rates to the amount retail customers pay for selected repairs, and because dealers derive a significant source of revenue from covered repairs and services, the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions encourage Florida dealers to raise their retail prices and rates to the detriment of Florida consumers.
Under the Florida Constitution, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Fla. Const. Art. I, § 9. However, "[t]he state has the police power to enact laws reasonably construed as expedient for protections of the public health, safety, welfare, or morals," which power "embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity or the public welfare as well as those designed to promote the public safety or public health." Brevard Cnty. v. Stack, 932 So.2d 1258, 1261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). In other words, "[t]he due process clause does not override the power of the state or its political subdivisions to establish laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community." Id. at 1262; see Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong, 300 So.2d 881, 884-85 (Fla.1974) (noting that the state has broad police powers and may "regulate any enterprise, trade, occupation or profession
The purpose of the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions is "to protect the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state by regulating the licensing of motor vehicle dealers and manufacturers, maintaining competition, providing consumer protection and fair trade and providing minorities with opportunities for full participation as motor vehicle dealers." Fla. Stat. § 320.605. The Alliance does not dispute that the State of Florida has a legitimate interest in regulating the motor vehicle industry. The Alliance insists, however, that the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions do not promote the interests of Florida consumers. Specifically, in its complaint, the Alliance alleges that the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions "bear no rational relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare, and are likely to hurt consumers in Florida and throughout the United States" by encouraging dealers to raise their retail prices for non-warranty repair work. The defendants disagree, arguing that the rationality of the relationship between the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions and the public interest is undeniable.
Although the court remains mindful of its limited role in assessing the validity of legislation, it finds, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Alliance, that in challenging the rationality of the relationship between the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions and the public welfare, the Alliance has sufficiently pled a due process claim. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Butler, 770 So.2d 1210, 1219 (Fla. 2000) (finding statutes that prohibited title insurance agents from rebating a portion of their risk premium unconstitutional because they did "not achieve the Legislature's avowed purposes and instead simply deprive[d] the consuming public of a choice in the price of products or services, the choice of which is the cornerstone of a competitive, free-market economy"); Dep't of Ins. v. Dade Cnty. Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So.2d 1032, 1034 (Fla.1986) (holding that a court may overturn a statute on due process grounds "when it is clear that it is not in any way designed to promote the people's health, safety or welfare, or that the statute has no reasonable relationship to the statute's avowed purpose"); Liquor Store v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371, 374 (Fla.1949) (holding that "[i]f the vantage sought is personal as distinguished from the general public then the police power may not be invoked" and that "constitutional law never sanctions the granting of sovereign power to one group of citizens to be exercised against another unless the general welfare is served"); see also Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So.2d 209, 212 (Fla.1963). While it may be true that the Florida
Both the United States and Florida Constitutions prohibit laws that impair the obligations of existing contracts. See U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 10; Fla. Const. Art. I, § 10. As the Eleventh Circuit has observed with regard to the federal Contract Clause, "'[a]lthough the language of the Contract Clause is facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the State to safeguard the vital interests of its people.'" Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. State of Fla., 141 F.3d 1427, 1433 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410, 103 S.Ct. 697, 74 L.Ed.2d 569 (1983) (internal citation omitted)). "Three factors are considered when evaluating a claim that the [federal] Contract Clause has been violated: (1) whether the law substantially impairs a contractual relationship; (2) whether there is a significant and legitimate public purpose for the law; and (3) whether the adjustments of rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties are based upon reasonable conditions and are of an appropriate nature." Id. To determine the degree of impairment permissible under Florida's Contract Clause, courts "must weigh the degree to which a party's contract rights are statutorily impaired against both the source of authority under which the state purports to alter the contractual relationship and the evil which it seeks to remedy." Pomponio v. Claridge of Pompano Condo., Inc., 378 So.2d 774, 780 (Fla.1979)); see also Cohn v. Grand Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 26 So.3d 8, 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). "Obviously, this becomes a balancing process to determine whether the nature and extent of the impairment is constitutionally tolerable in light of the importance of the state's objective, or whether it unreasonably intrudes into the parties' bargain to a degree greater than necessary to achieve that objective." Pompanio, 378 So.2d at 780. Courts consider several factors when determining the severity of impairment under Florida's Contract Clause, including (1) whether the law was enacted to address a broad, generalized economic or social problem; (2)
The defendants argue that the Alliance has failed to state a viable Contract Clause claim because it has not identified any specific contract or contractual provision that is impaired and also because the Alliance lacks standing to assert such a claim. The court is not persuaded. Contrary to the defendants' assertions, the Alliance has identified the contractual provisions it contends are impaired by the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions — i.e., the provisions in the Members' Dealer Agreements that allow for negotiation of reimbursement rates. The defendants' first argument thus is unavailing. Regarding the defendants' second argument on standing, it is well-settled that an association may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself, and "[e]ven in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members."
Notably, the third prong of the associational standing test — the only prong at issue in this case — is a prudential, rather than constitutional, requirement and typically does not need to be met when an association seeks only declaratory relief on behalf of its members. See, e.g., Conn. State Dental Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1354 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that declaratory relief is "normally appropriate relief for associational standing"); Wein v. Am. Huts, Inc., 313 F.Supp.2d 1356, 1360 (S.D.Fla.2004); Lake Lucerne Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Dolphin Stadium Corp., 801 F.Supp. 684, 690 (S.D.Fla.1992) ("Courts applying the third prong of the Hunt test have generally allowed associations standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief."). Indeed, "[t]he determination of `whether an association has standing to invoke the court's remedial powers on behalf of its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought. If in a proper case the association seeks [a] declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured.'" Wein, 313 F.Supp.2d at 1360 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 515, 95 S.Ct. 2197). In this case, the Alliance seeks only declaratory relief with regard to its Contract Clause claim asserted in Count I. Although that fact alone may provide a sufficient basis upon which to reject the defendants' standing challenge, see id. at 1360-61, the court notes further, with regard to the nature of the claim asserted, that the Alliance alleges that its Members' contracts have been impaired in the same manner by the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions — specifically, that the Members are precluded from exercising their right to negotiate reimbursement rates — and that there is no need for each Member to separately establish impairment of its Dealer Agreements.
As the Alliance points out, the issue is whether the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions were foreseeable to the
According to Fla. Stat. § 320.696(6), "[a] licensee shall not recover or attempt to recover, directly or indirectly, any of its costs for compensating a motor vehicle dealer under this section."
The United States Constitution bestows upon Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States...." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "Although the Constitution does not in terms limit the power of States to regulate commerce, [the Supreme Court has] long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute." United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007); see Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1108 (11th Cir. 2002) ("Although the clause speaks literally only to the powers of Congress, it is well settled that it has a `dormant' aspect as well, namely, one that serves as `a substantive restriction on permissible state regulation of interstate commerce.'"). "`This "negative" aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism — that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.'" Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1108 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74, 108 S.Ct. 1803, 100 L.Ed.2d 302 (1988)). "To determine whether a statutory scheme violates the dormant Commerce Clause, [courts] employ two tiers of analysis." Id. "If the scheme `directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, [courts] have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.'" Id. at 1109. "Only if such a regulation is shown to `advance[ ] a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives' will it be upheld." Id. (quoting Limbach, 486 U.S. at 278, 108 S.Ct. 1803). "`When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, [courts] have examined whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.'" Id. (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986)). "Though the two tiers of analysis are not clearly distinguishable, `[i]n either situation, the critical consideration is the
The defendants argue that the Recoupment Bar is not facially discriminatory because it applies equally to all manufacturers, regardless of residency.
The ripeness doctrine involves both jurisdictional and prudential concerns. Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1997). "Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases and controversies of sufficient concreteness to evidence a ripeness for review." Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1). "Even when the constitutional minimum has been met, ... prudential considerations may still counsel judicial restraint." Id. (internal marks omitted). "The ripeness doctrine protects federal courts from engaging in speculation or wasting their resources through the review of potential or abstract disputes." Id. In other words, "[t]he doctrine seeks to avoid entangling courts in the hazards of premature adjudication." Id. (internal marks omitted). In considering ripeness, courts must decide whether the issues in a particular case are suitable for judicial decision and whether a failure to adjudicate the matter will impose a hardship on the parties. Id. In so doing, courts consider whether there is "sufficient injury to meet Article III's requirement of a case or controversy and, if so, whether the claim is sufficiently mature, and the issues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by the court." Id. (internal marks omitted). Where there is threatened action by the government, a party need not "expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the threat — for example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be enforced." MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128-29, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007). "The plaintiff's own action (or inaction) in failing to violate the law eliminates the imminent threat of prosecution, but nonetheless does not eliminate Article III jurisdiction ... because the threat-eliminating behavior was effectively coerced." Id. at 129, 127 S.Ct. 764. "The dilemma posed by that coercion — putting the challenger to the choice between abandoning his rights or risking prosecution — is a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate." Id. (internal marks omitted). "Injunctive and declaratory relief is available so long as the plaintiffs demonstrate a `genuine threat of imminent prosecution.'" Am. Booksellers Ass'n,
Applying these principles in this case, the court has little difficulty finding that the Alliance's Commerce Clause challenge to the Recoupment Bar is ripe. Not only does the statute prohibit licensees from recouping costs imposed by the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions, but it also provides for civil and criminal penalties in the event of a violation.
In addition to its Commerce Clause claim, the Alliance alleges in Count II of its complaint that the Recoupment Bar violates the Contract Clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions by prohibiting Members from exercising
The Extraterritorial Benefit Restriction prohibits licensees from offering incentive programs in areas outside of Florida when they do not offer the same program in Florida unless the licensee demonstrates that the exclusion of the program from Florida is "reasonably supported by substantially different economic or marketing considerations than are applicable to the licensee's same line-make dealers in this state." Fla. Stat. § 320.64(38). According to the Alliance, Members offer bonus, incentive, and other benefit programs to dealers for a variety of reasons, including to stimulate vehicle sales and interbrand competition and address local market conditions. Members issue program-specific guidelines and rules setting forth the eligibility requirements and criteria that dealers must meet in order to qualify for benefits under a program. The decision to offer bonus and incentive programs is based on a variety of factors, including prevailing market conditions, the costs associated with offering the programs, and the costs of doing business in a particular state. The Alliance avers that, because of the Extraterritorial Benefit Restriction, Members may be required to alter the manner in which they research, document, and resolve all of their decisions about benefit programs offered in interstate commerce in the event they ultimately decide not to offer a program in Florida. According to the Alliance, the provision may also require Members who decide not to offer national and regional benefit programs in Florida to share with Florida authorities and dealers sensitive and confidential economic and business-related data that informs their business judgments, including data related entirely to out-of-state dealers and markets. The Alliance suggests, moreover, that even if a Member believes in good faith that its decision to offer a benefit program nationally or in the same region as Florida but not within the state is reasonably supported by substantially different economic or marketing considerations, the Member will be reluctant to exercise its legitimate business judgment to exclude Florida because of the threat of criminal sanctions and mandatory treble damages if it is mistaken. In short, the Alliance maintains that the Extraterritorial Benefit Restriction "directly impacts
The defendants argue that the Alliance's facial attack on the Extraterritorial Benefit Restriction fails because the statute can be constitutionally applied in certain instances due to the exception for differing economic or marketing conditions, rendering the statute valid under Salerno.
As with the Recoupment Bar, the defendants also argue that the Alliance's Commerce Clause challenge to the Extraterritorial Benefit Restriction is not ripe because the Alliance has failed to allege the existence of any specific benefit program that might be affected by the statute, much less the details of the program or the justification for not offering it in the state of Florida. According to the defendants, Count III lacks sufficient factual detail to support a decision by this court. In the defendants' view, the court cannot resolve this claim without reviewing an actual benefit program affected by the statute and assessing individual harm suffered by a Member. For the same reasons the court gave in rejecting the defendants' ripeness challenge to Count II, the court disagrees. Again, all that is required at this stage of the proceedings is
Finally, in Count IV of its complaint, the Alliance seeks a declaratory judgment that its Members may refuse to offer or reduce bonus, incentive, or other benefit programs in the state of Florida as a way to offset the economic burden imposed by the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions without violating the Recoupment Bar. In Count V, the Alliance seeks a declaratory judgment that, to the extent such a reduction or elimination of a bonus, incentive, or other benefit program offered in Florida in response to the economic burden imposed by the Parts and Labor Reimbursement Provisions is deemed inconsistent with the Recoupment Bar, the Extraterritorial Benefit Restriction permits such action provided that the Members demonstrate that their higher parts and labor reimbursement costs in Florida are substantially different than those in other states. The defendants argue neither claim is ripe because the Alliance has not alleged concrete facts to support either one and the Alliance's interpretations of the statutes are inconsistent with the language, structure, and purpose of the laws. The court rejects the defendants' ripeness challenges for the reasons previously stated. The court also finds that, in order to interpret the statutes, it will need to consider them in the context in which they were enacted, including their history and purpose, as well as their practical impact. The court thus denies the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts IV and V and will entertain a motion for summary judgment as to both counts at the appropriate time.
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 46) is